With the acceleration of technological advancements and the increasing visibility of artificial intelligence-oriented content in everyday life, the concept of artificial intelligence has evolved into a field attracting the attention not only of technical circles but also of almost every segment of society. Artificial intelligence systems, which were previously utilized predominantly within the defense industry and military technologies, are now employed across a broad spectrum ranging from electronic devices used in daily life to digital content production platforms. This process of development has caused artificial intelligence to transform from a mere technical instrument into a phenomenon giving rise to social, cultural, and legal consequences.
In particular, the creation of musical works, poems, novels, visual artworks, and similar productions through artificial intelligence systems has brought to the forefront the issue of how such products should be evaluated within the legal order. Indeed, these discussions constitute contemporary legal issues addressed not only within national legal systems but also on international platforms and before the European Commission.
Within this framework, it is first necessary to examine the position and scope of the concept of a “work” under Turkish law. Subsequently, the manner in which products generated through artificial intelligence should be assessed within the context of intellectual property law must be analyzed.
Today, the number of products created by artificial intelligence systems has increased significantly. Moreover, a substantial portion of these products possesses aesthetic and artistic qualities comparable to works produced by human beings. At this very point, the principal legal issue emerges: Can a creation generated by artificial intelligence qualify as a “work” within the meaning of the Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works No. 5846 (“LIAW”), and to whom shall authorship of such products belong?
Under Turkish law, the concept of a work is regulated within the scope of the LIAW. Pursuant to Article 1/B of the Law, a work is defined as “all kinds of intellectual and artistic products bearing the characteristics of their author and deemed scientific and literary works, musical works, works of fine arts, or cinematographic works.”
Based on this definition, it is evident that creations lacking the elements stipulated by the Law cannot benefit from the protection afforded under the LIAW. The legislator has not recognized every intellectual production as a work; accordingly, productions failing to reflect the personal characteristics and originality of their creator are not regarded as works, even if they are the product of a certain degree of labor.
Nevertheless, the fact that a work has been created through the use of computers, tablets, or similar technological instruments does not in itself preclude the qualification of such creation as a work. The decisive criterion is the active contribution and individuality of the author throughout the creative process. Therefore, provided that the remaining legal requirements are satisfied, there exists no distinction under the LIAW between a work created by a painter digitally through a tablet and one created upon canvas.
On the other hand, elements remaining solely at the level of thought or idea cannot be regarded as works. In order for a creation to acquire the status of a work, it must transcend the individual’s intellectual sphere and become embodied in the external world in a concrete manner. Although completion of the work is not mandatory, it must nevertheless be presented in a perceptible form.
One of the examples demonstrating the productive capacity of artificial intelligence technology is the “Moral Storytelling System” developed by Margaret Sarlej at the University of New South Wales. Within this system, users select among various predetermined emotions, and the artificial intelligence generates stories resembling Aesop’s fables while containing moral conclusions in accordance with those emotions.
Another field in which artificial intelligence technology has been utilized is literature. Within the system developed by Ross Goodwin, sensors and GPS data installed in a vehicle were analyzed by artificial intelligence, and the data collected throughout the journey were subsequently transformed into literary texts.
Artificial intelligence has also long been utilized in the field of poetry generation. One of the remarkable examples in this regard is the application titled “Verse by Verse” developed by Google. Within this system, which remains under development, selections are made among poets uploaded into the database; based upon the first line written by the user, appropriate poetic verses are suggested, and the continuation of the poem is shaped with the support of artificial intelligence.
Another example of the use of artificial intelligence appears in the field of painting. Within the scope of “The Next Rembrandt” project, hundreds of works belonging to the renowned painter Rembrandt van Rijn were digitally analyzed, and the artist’s technical characteristics, brush techniques, lighting preferences, and compositional understanding were examined through artificial intelligence. Following numerous analyses and developmental stages, a new painting highly resembling Rembrandt’s artistic style was created.
In addition, AI-assisted productions in the field of music have also attracted considerable attention. In particular, various musical works intended for use within the film and gaming industries are generated through artificial intelligence systems such as MorpheuS and AIVA.
One of the noteworthy recent examples is the reproduction of visual depictions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk through the use of artificial intelligence.
For a photograph to qualify as a work within the scope of the LIAW, it must first bear the individuality of its creator. In addition, the photograph must possess aesthetic value. Indeed, photographs possessing aesthetic qualities are protected as works of fine art pursuant to Article 4 of the LIAW.
Nevertheless, the legislator has also extended special protection to certain photographs that do not satisfy the criterion of aesthetic value. Photographs of a technical or scientific nature may likewise benefit from protection under the LIAW by being regarded as works.
Furthermore, special provisions have been established concerning portraits. Pursuant to Article 86 of the LIAW, portraits may not, as a rule, be disclosed to the public until ten years have elapsed following the death of the depicted individual.
With respect to a person’s photograph, at least two distinct rights holders exist: the photographer and the person depicted within the photograph. Consequently, photographs constitute a particular area requiring simultaneous evaluation under both intellectual property law and personality rights.
Where a photograph qualifies as a work, the photographer shall acquire the status of author and may exercise the economic and moral rights regulated under the LIAW. In other words, copyright over the photograph shall, as a rule, belong to the photographer.
However, the fact that copyright belongs to the photographer does not imply that the photograph may be used without limitation. A photograph depicting an individual constitutes personal data within the meaning of the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698. Likewise, pursuant to Articles 135 et seq. of the Turkish Criminal Code, the unlawful recording and use of personal data may constitute a criminal offense.
Moreover, an individual’s image is also considered to fall within the scope of private life. Therefore, the publication, reproduction, or disclosure of a photograph without the explicit consent of the relevant individual may constitute an unlawful act. Even where the person sharing the photograph is the photographer himself or herself, such circumstance shall not eliminate legal and criminal liability. Indeed, such acts may give rise to violations of the provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code concerning the protection of personal data and the right to privacy.
Article 86 of the LIAW also provides certain exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, separate consent may not be required for visual depictions of persons playing a role in political and social life, images captured during public ceremonies or general meetings, and photographs relating to daily events in the nature of news reporting. Nevertheless, even in such cases, the provisions of the Turkish Civil Code protecting personality rights shall continue to apply.
Within this context, it is accepted that the use of photographs belonging to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk falls within the scope of public use pursuant to the relevant legal regulations.
The absence of an independent legal personality attributed to artificial intelligence under the Turkish legal system gives rise to significant consequences regarding the qualification of AI-generated products as works. Indeed, authorship under the LIAW is recognized exclusively for natural persons. Therefore, under the current legislative framework, it is not possible for artificial intelligence systems to be directly recognized as authors.
Accordingly, the protection of visuals or other creations generated by artificial intelligence as works under the LIAW remains the subject of serious legal debate within the existing legal order. Since authorship under the Law has been specifically reserved for natural persons, even if artificial intelligence were to be granted a legal status in the future, it does not appear possible for authorship to be directly attributed to artificial intelligence unless the relevant legislative provisions are amended.
In line with the foregoing, visual depictions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk generated through artificial intelligence are not currently regarded as works within the framework of existing legislation; therefore, the use of such content is generally considered to be open to the public.